Vietnamese artillery in the battle of Dien Bien Phu (file photo)
The Politburo and the General Military Commission based on the force, situation of the battle, the terrain and the weather have decided to launch a campaign against the enemy’s group of fortresses in Dien Bien Phu and mobilize a large number of our main forces in the Campaign. Following the idea of “fighting for victory” by the Party Central Committee and Uncle Ho and the battlefield of the two sides, the Campaign Command decided to “fight firmly and win firmly”. That was a hard but extremely right, scientific choice by the Campaign Command, the Party Committee, and General Vo Nguyen Giap. To implement the plan, the Campaign Command flexibly organized and used forces in accordance with each period and phase of the Campaign as well as the developments of the battlefield. After 55 days and nights of fighting resiliently, bravely, creatively, we annihilated, captured and seized all the enemy’s troops and materiel in Dien Bien Phu. That victory was created by the art of organizing and using forces.
1. Concentrating strength and firepower to completely destroy each group of targets in the outer circle. After deploying troops to Dien Bien Phu, the French attempted to consolidate the system of fortifications and battleground and make Dien Bien Phu into a strong fortress with a high density of subregions and resistance centres from the outside to the inside. To ensure victory in each phase and battle, the Campaign Command concentrated the absolute advantage in force over the enemy in all their resistance centres. In the Phase 1 (from March 13th to March 17th, 1954), we deployed 5 regiments to attack and destroy the enemy’s 3 attacking battalions and restrain their 2 mobile battalions. In the first battle against Him Lam resistance centre, we fully awared that Him Lam was a strong group of fortifications, and that victory of the first battle would facilitate the development of the Campaign. The Campaign Command mobilized a much larger force than the enemy. More specifically, our infantry troops were 6 times more than the enemy’s while our artillery and mortar were 10 times more than the enemy’s. In this phase, the Campaign mobilized 234 guns and mortars of all types and disposed them in mountain ranges around Dien Bien basin to support the infantry units. In the first assault called “Thunder”, we used 11 artillery and mortar companies (accounting for 70% of our firepower in the Campaign) to attack the targets, namely Him Lam, Central Subregion, airport, artillery battlefields and depots of the enemy. It is worth noting that our artillery forces were secretly deployed on mountain slopes in order to surprisingly and strongly attack the stated targets and suppress the enemy’s artillery and mortars. Thanks to timely, effective support of artillery forces, our 2 infantry regiments attacked and destroyed the enemy’s resistance centre of Doc Lap, 1 Foreign Legion battalion and 483 enemy troops, captured 200 enemy troops, defeated their counterattack and tool control of this position.
It should be noted that we not only precisely evaluated the enemy’s situation to focus our force with a view to rapidly destroy and completely surprise the enemy, but also closely, cleverly and effectively combined the infantry with the artillery, impulse with fire, and attack to occupy the battlefield with operations to defeat the enemy’s counterattacks. Consequently, we destroyed outer fortifications to pave the way for the forces to attack the heart of the enemy’s group of fortresses. However, in the Phase 2 (from March 30th to April 30th, 1954), the principle of focusing force were not employed strictly.
2. Using forces for key positions and encirclement properly. After realizing limitations in the early Phase 2, the Campaign determined to organize small-scale forces to encircle, besiege, divide and isolate each fortress and group of fortresses, which gradually laid siege to the central area. The Campaign Command directed units in each direction to reorganize their force; to actively build the battlefield for encirclement and offensive. They closely combined encirclement with attack to break through the enemy’s defensive line to create favourable conditions for other forces to lay siege, prevent the enemy, and defeat their counterattacks. Then we gradually attacked to occupy each fortress of the enemy and narrow their defensive battlefield. At the same time, we overcame all difficulties to dig hundreds of kilometres of trenches for combat, movement and daily activities, and thousands of fortifications and gun emplacement only in a short time. The system of trenches increasingly reached deep into the enemy’s fortifications as a noose around the enemy’s “neck”. Basing on that posture, the Campaign Command organized forces to attack the enemy widespread, and completely lay siege to attack and annihilate the enemy. At the same time, we prevented their fire and destroyed each resistance position as well as the enemy’s strength and morale.
Thanks to the flexible, creative method of organizing and using forces, in the mid-April, our troops step by step changed the complexion of the battlefield. Muong Thanh airport was broken off by our trenches. Our artillery from the E hill repeatedly fired on the enemy’s gun batteries in the centre of Muong Thanh while our anti-aircraft guns were moved to Muong Thanh paddy field to control the sky. We forced the enemy to parachute at great height and more than half of the enemy’s ammo and food supply fall into our battlefield. Until late of April 1954, although over 10,000 French troops remained in Dien Bien Phu, only 42% of them were capable to fight.
3. Concentrating forces on general offensive to win decisive victory. The Campaign Command realized the rapid developments of the battlefield and the opportunity to completely destroy the enemy’s group of fortresses in Dien Bien Phu. They decided to mobilize all available forces in the general offensive for the final victory. Since 14.00 on May 7th, 1954, in all directions and flanks, our entire forces were shifted from encirclement to general offensive. Our forces closely cooperated with one another to create the combined strength and rapidly attack to occupy the targets at the centre of Muong Thanh. The Campaign Command bravely ordered the Regiment 209 under the Division 312 to cross Muong Thanh bridge, penetrate deep into the enemy’s headquarters at the right moment. General De Castries and the entire command of the enemy’s group of fortresses were arrested alive, thereby forcing all enemy troops to surrender unconditionally. That was also a brilliant decision to prevent 2,000 enemy troops from fleeing to Laos in the enemy’s “seabird” plan. All the forces closely cooperated with one another to attack the enemy, contain, isolate and prevent the enemy from support their forces stationed in Dien Bien Phu.
The Command of Dien Bien Phu Campaign organized and used the forces properly to promote the capability of each unit engaged in the Campaign, which contributing to the victory of the strategic battle and leading to the final victory. The art of using forces in this Campaign should be continuously studied and applied to defend the Homeland.